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Abstract—SRAMs are very sensitive to radiation effects. When
embedded systems working in the extreme radiation environ-
ments, bit flips may occur frequently and decrease the reliability
of the systems significantly.
In this paper, a self-scrubbing scheme is proposed for embed-
ded systems in extreme radiation environments. In the proposed
scheme, both scrubbing and error correcting codes are used
to mitigate a large number of the errors in the RAMs. Along
with this, a separate scrubber is designed to scrub the RAM
independently, when the CPUs are busy. In addition, the scrubber
is a portable module and the hardware cost does not grow with
the size of the available RAM. The results of the experiments
show that, in the neutron radiation environments where the error
rate in the unhardened RAMs is approximately 1.2bit/(KB·h),
while the error rate of the self-scrubbing RAMs is less than
8.7× 10−5bit/(KB·h), which is one fifth of the error rate of the
conventional ECC RAMs.
Index Terms—Neutron Radiation, SRAM, SEU Mitigation,
ECC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radiations exists throughout the entire solar system, and
includes solar flares, solar wind, galactic cosmic radiation and
radiation emitting from nuclear reactions. It is well known
that radiation rays with high energy (e.g. X-ray, gamma,
neutron, electrons, protons and heavy ions rays) can cause
heavy damage on semi-conductor devices [1]–[3]. When an
electronic system operates in high radiation environments, the
radiation may change the status of the circuits by producing the
incorrect outputs, decrease performance and can even damage
the electronic devices permanently [4].
Cumulative effects and single event effects (SEE) are two
main types of radiation effects on the integrated circuits.
Cumulative effects (e.g. total ionizing dose (TID) [5], [6] and
displacement damage (DD) [7]–[9]) are unrecoverable long-
term effects. They can change the parameters of semiconductor
materials and make the circuits malfunction completely. SEE
is an effect caused by single charged particle. SEE includes a
number of types: 1) single event transient (SET), 2) multiple-
Bit upset (MBU), 3) single event functional interrupt (SEFI),
4) single event latch-up (SEL), 5) single event burnout (SEB),
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6) single event gate rupture (SEGR) and 7) the single event
upset (SEU). Among these, SET and SEU are the most
common effects causing soft errors (recoverable or transient
errors), while SEL, SEGR and SEB cause permanent errors in
electronic systems [10]–[13].
Therefore, it is necessary to harden the embedded sys-
tems which are supposed to work in radiation environments.
Compared with the normal embedded systems, the system
dedicated to the nuclear environments need to be able to
operate in the environments with much higher radiation levels.
For example, the radiation level was more than 10 Sv/h
during the three mile island nuclear accident [14]. In such
high radiation environments, system failures occur within
a short time and operation time also decreases drastically.
As reported in the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, the
radiation dedicated robot, STR-1, only operated for total 200
hours to clean the building surface even it was protected by
shells [15]. In the areas with higher radiation levels, operation
time could be shorter which ranges from few minutes to few
hours.
Considering that those devices are not likely reusable after
exposure under radiation, a strategy is proposed to use cheaper
devices instead of expensive radiation hardened devices in the
radiation tasks to lower the total costs. However, those cheap
devices, especially SRAM parts in the embedded systems,
are vulnerable to the radiation effects. Due to the feedback
mechanism for data retention in the SRAMs, the bit flips
occur frequently in the high radiation environments [16]. The
SRAM parts have to be hardened for radiation tasks. In order
to mitigate errors in the memory systems, a series of error
mitigation strategies have been taken into consideration includ-
ing the triple modular redundancy (TMR) technology, Error
correcting codes (ECC) and Scrubbing technology [17]–[21].
TMR is widely used to protect the key-systems. Although,
it triples the hardware resources to achieve high reliability
[22], [23], it aso increases the costs of the radiation tasks
significantly. In addition, it can not correct the cumulative
errors, typical for the extreme radiation environments. ECC
is widely known as an anti-interference encoding strategy to
enhance the reliability of memory devices and communication
systems [24]–[29]. However, this strategy is vulnerable to the
multi-bit error [30]–[34]. If the number of the errors in the
memory units exceeds the fault tolerant limit, the errors can not
be corrected. Scrubbing technologies [35] are used to mitigate
the cumulative errors. It uses free clocks periods to read back
the data from the memory to operate the correction. However,
if the CPUs are busy, the scrubbing rates may be lower than
error rates in the extreme radiation environments.
In this paper, a self-scrubbing scheme with error correcting
code is proposed to harden the embedded systems for extreme
radiation environments. The scrubbing operation is controlled
by a separate module, which is running at the twice the
frequency of the system clock. In this way, there will be
double bandwidth to operate the instructions from the CPUs
and the scrubbing operations from the separate controller
simultaneously. The original instructions will not be affected.
Therefore, it can be easily transplanted in the existing embed-
ded systems. Real world radiation experiments were conducted
with a neutron source at the ChipIr facility at ISIS, Didcot,
UK [36]. The flux of the neutron beam is 5× 106cm2s−1. In
the experiment, the observed errors rates in unhardened RAM
is 1.2bit/(KB·h). The errors rates in conventional ECC ram is
approximately 4.3×10−4bit/(KB·h), while the self-scrubbing
RAM is less than 8.7× 10−5bit/(KB·h).
The main contributions of this article are stated as follows:
1) The proposed design is highly flexible and reliable.
Compared to the conventional scrubbing approach, the
proposed design requires no free periods to conduct the
scrubbing operations. The memory units can be scrubbed
at the high frequency to ensure the errors can be corrected
in time. In addition, instructions from the CPUs and the
scrubbing operations can be carried out simultaneously.
The original program will not be affected. Therefore,
it can be applied in various embedded systems without
software modifications.
2) The proposed design is an area-efficient design, which
can be used to harden low-cost computer systems. The
separate scrubber consumes significantly less hardware
resources in comparison to TMR designs. The im-
plementation on an entry-level FPGA (i.g. XC7A15T-
1CPG236C) shows that it only costs 150 LUTs to build
the controller for a 32KB RAM. The scalability tests also
show that the costs of the design does not scale up linearly
with the RAM size. When the RAM size scales from 8KB
to 256 KB, the costs of the LUTs scale from 128 to 212.
3) The proposed SEU mitigation design can achieve high
SEU correction rate for the radiation hardened system.
The results of the real world radiation experiments show
that it can correct most errors in the RAM under neutron
radiation, where the error rates in unhardened RAMs is
approximately 1.2bit/(KB·h). In the 6-hours radiation
exposure experiments, the error rate of the self-scrubbing
RAM is 8.7×10−5bit/(KB·h), which is significantly less
than the error rate of the conventional ECC RAM.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the
architecture of the Self-Scrubbing scheme. Section III shows
the hardware implementation of the systems and the scalability
of the design. Section IV shows the results of neutron radiation
experiment designs and section V concludes the paper.
II. ARCHITECTURE OF THE SELF-SCRUBBING SCHEME
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The architecture of self-scrubbing scheme is shown in
Fig. 1. Compared to the conventional CPU-RAM structure, a
separate scrubber is introduced between CPUs and RAMs. The
original data stream and instructions between CPUs and RAMs
will be transmitted by the scrubber. In this scheme, the scrub-
ber and the RAM part operates at double the frequency of the
systems, so there will be twice the bandwidth for the scrubber
to conduct the scrubbing operations (e.g. fault detection and
error correction). When the scrubber conducts the instructions
from CPUs and the scrubbing operation simultaneously, half
of the system clock periods will be used for the scrubbing
operations and the original timing sequence of the instructions
for the CPUs will not be changed. Therefore, it can be easily
implemented in the existing radiation dedicated designs.
A. The design of the scrubber
Switcher ECC encoder
ECC decoderOutput buffer
Scrubbing controller RAMCPU
Scrubbing operations
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Fig. 2. Sequence of input operations stream
The design of the scrubber is shown in the Fig. 2. There are
5 modules in the scrubber which are 1) switcher, 2) scrubbing
controller, 3) output buffer, 4) ECC encoder and 5) ECC
decoder. The scrubbing controller generates the scrubbing
operations, which has two working modes, 1) detection and 2)
correction modes. If there is no detected error, the controller
will work in the detection mode and generate the reading
instructions to read the data from the RAM. If the error bits
in the return data are detected, the controller will work in the
correction mode and generate writing instructions to overwrite
the error bits. As mentioned, the scrubber is operating at the
double frequency, so the scrubbing controller and the CPUs
are working in the different clock domains. The switcher is the
module to mix the operations from different clock domains. In
this design, (12,8) hamming code is used as correcting code.
It is a simple correcting code, that can be easily implemented.
The ECC encoder and decoder are combinational circuits.
There is no additional delay for CPUs’ instructions. After
decoding, the data required by CPUs will be sent to the output
buffer to rebuild the timing sequence. The rest of the data will
be sent to controller for detection.
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RAM we
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Fig. 3. Timing Diagram of the RAM.
B. Timing sequence of the scrubbing
The timing diagram of the RAM is shown in the Fig.
3. RAM clk and sys clk represent the RAM clock and the
system clock respectively. RAM clock operates at twice of the
frequency of the system clock. The CHK addr is the checking
address which indicates that the address is being checked. The
R/W addr is the address operated by the external modules.
In this figure, the CHK addresses and R/W addresses are
represented by alphabet and numbers respectively to indicate
that the external module and the internal module are accessing
the different addresses. The ‘we’, ‘addr’, ‘din’ and ‘dout’ of
the RAM in this figure represent the write enable, address,
data in and data out of the RAM respectively. The buff out is
the outputs of the scrubber which is connected to the external
modules.
In this figure, the CPU is accessing address 1, address 2
and address 3. The scrubber is accessing the address A and
address B. The R/W operations and the scrubbing operations
are arranged one by one. The ‘D1’, ‘D2’, ‘D3’, ‘DA’ and ‘DB’
represent the data from the address 1, 2, 3, A and B. The ‘DW’
indicates the detected error data. When data from address B
is incorrect, the scrubber will trigger a scrubbing mode with
a writing operation to overwrite the memory unit. If there is
no detected error, it will take two RAM clock cycles to check
the unit. If there are detected errors, it will require four RAM
clock cycles to correct the errors.
C. Address conflicts
It is possible that the CPUs and the scrubber access the
same memory units at the same moment, which could cause
address conflicts. In this case, the scrubber could overwrite
the units with the outdated data. In order to solve that issue,
the scrubber will monitor the current address. If there is a
address conflict, the scrubber will skip the current checking
address. In addition, considering that most R/W operations
are conducted in the order of addresses, the sequence of the
checking addresses are designed in the reverse address order.
III. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DESIGN
A. Architecture of the evaluation system
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Fig. 4. The architecture of the prototype system
The architecture of the system is shown in the Fig. 4. The
hardware design includes an UART module, R/W controller
and RAM. The UART module is responsible for the UART
communication. When the boards start to work, the host will
sent reading and writing instructions to operate the RAM via
UART. The R/W controller is the module which is used to
conduct the reading and writing instructions. The RAM parts
in the system is replaceable. It can be unhardened RAMs or
hardened RAMs according to the respective requirements. In
this figure, the design on the FPGA 1 is used to represent the
system without hardened RAM. The design on the FPGA 2 is
used to represent the system hardened by the self-scrubbing
scheme.
When the FPGA boards are exposed in the radiation en-
vironments, the host will send the instructions to read back
the data from the RAM. By comparing the current data to the
previous data, the error bits can be detected. By using this
system, we can analyze the error rate of the unhardened and
hardened RAM systems in the radiation environments.
B. Costs of the hardware resources
The comparison has been carried out between the unhard-
ened RAMs and the hardened RAMs with the same available
RAM size and the same bandwidth for CPUs and external
modules. As the self-scrubbing RAM uses more bandwidth
and more memory for error correction, the actual frequency
and the size of the self-scrubbing RAM is higher.
Two types of the hardware resources, memory size and
the LUTs, are used to build the self-scrubbing design. The
additional costs of the RAMs are used to store correcting
codes. The LUTs are used to build the scrubber.
In this scheme, (12,8) hamming codes are used as the error
correcting code. Therefore, for each memory units, there will
be 12 bits in total. Among them, 8 bits are for data and
the other 4 bits are used for correcting codes. Therefore, it
consumes 50% more memory. The costs of the RAM grow
linearly with the size of the available RAM size.
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Fig. 5. The the hardware costs with the scale of the design
The comparison of the LUT costs is shown in the Fig. 5. The
costs of the self-scrubbing system and the unhardened systems
grow simultaneously with the size of the available RAM. The
costs of the scrubber, which is the additional part of the scrub-
ber, does not grow linearly with size of the available RAM.
When the available RAM size is 8KB, the unhardened and
hardened designs consume 560 and 688 LUTs respectively.
When the available RAM size is 256KB, the unhardened and
hardened designs consume 720 and 932 LUTs respectively.
The additional number of the LUTs only increases slightly
for higher address width in scrubber controller.
IV. NEUTRON RADIATION EXPERIMENT
In this paper, we conducted the real world radiation ex-
periments to evaluate the performance of the design. The
experiments were conducted with a neutron source at the
ChipIr facility at ISIS, STFC Rutherford Appleton Laboratory,
Didcot, UK [36]. ChipIr provides a neutron spectrum which is
suitable to emulate effects of terrestrial neutrons in electronic
devices and systems. The ChipIr neutron flux (with En > 10
MeV) has been measured to be approximately 5×106cm2s−1.
The neutron flux at ChipIr is about 8 to 9 orders of magnitude
higher than the terrestrial flux at sea level.
In the experiments, the operating FPGA boards operate in
the radiation room for hours. The host PC in the controller
room is connected to the FPGAs via UART. It will keep
reading data from the RAMs in the working FPGA every 5
seconds. If the return data from FPGAs is different from the
previous data, the error bits can be detected.
The self-scrubbing design is implemented on the Digilent
Cmod A7-15T. It is a low price entry-level FPGA development
board. There is a Artix-7 XC7A15T-1CPG236C FPGA with
112.5 KB block RAM on the boards. We designed three
experiments in this paper: 1) Comparison between unhardened
RAMs with different memory size, 2) Comparison between
unhardened RAMs and the self-scrubbing RAMs 3) Com-
parison between the conventional ECC RAMs and the self-
scrubbing RAMs.
A. Comparison between unhardened RAMs with different
memory size
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Fig. 6. The number of the errors in the unhardened RAMs
The number of the errors in the unhardened RAMs with
different memory size is shown in the Fig. 6. In the experi-
ments, we conducted the experiments with the 32KB RAMs
and 64 KB RAMs for 4 hours. In the experiments, both RAMs
were conducted twice. We use average numbers of the errors
to compare the error rates.
As we can see in the figure, the number of the observed
errors in both 32KB and 64KB RAMs increase linearly with
the radiation time. After 4 hours radiation experiments, the
average number of the observed errors in the 32KB RAMs
is 159. The average number of observed errors in the 64KB
RAMs is 303, which is approximately double of the number
of the errors in the 32KB. The errors rates of the RAM in the
given radiation environments can be represented as follow:
R =
Nerror
Tradiation · SRAM
, (1)
where the R represents the error rates of the RAM in the given
environment, Nerrors represents the number of the error bits
in total, Tradiation represents the radiation time and the Sram
represents the size of the RAM. Therefore, It can calculated
that the observed error rates of the RAMs under the neutron
radiation is approximately 1.2bit/(KB·h). The results also
show that the error rates remain robust irrespective of the RAM
size.
B. Comparison between unhardened RAMs and the self-
scrubbing RAMs
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Fig. 7. Setup of Neutron radiation experiment
The comparison between unhardened RAM and self-
scrubbing RAM is shown in the Fig. 7. The available un-
hardened RAM and the self-scrubbing RAM are both 32KB.
The number of bit flips in self-scrubbing ECC RAM remains
at zero during the entire experiment while the number of bit
flips in unhardened RAM rises to 32 in the initial 1 hours. As
both RAMs are working in the same radiation environment, it
proves that the design of self-refresh ECC RAM is effective
for SEU mitigation.
C. Comparison between the conventional ECC RAMs and the
self-scrubbing RAMs
The comparison between built-in ECC RAM and self-
scrubbing RAM is shown in the Fig. 8. In this experiments,
the built-in ECC RAM is the normal RAM haredened by
Xilinx official ECC modules, which is used as the reference
RAM. Both built-in ECC RAM and the self-scrubbing RAM
are operating under neutron radiation for more than 6 hours.
After the 360 minutes radiation experiment, the total number
of observed errors in the conventional ECC RAM is five, while
the number of the errors in the self-scrubbing RAM is only
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Fig. 8. Setup of Neutron radiation experiment
one. It can also be seen there are increasing number of errors
after 200 minutes radiation. It is because that the conventional
ECC RAMs use the ECC decoder to correct the output data
without refreshing the stored data inside the RAMs. When
there are more error bits accumulated in the RAM, it is more
likely that the number of error bits in one unit will exceed the
fault tolerance. The hamming code used in this paper is one
bit error correction code, so the fault tolerance is one bit.
In the experiment, the first observed error in the conven-
tional ECC RAM is detected after 234 minutes radiation,
while the first observed error in the self-scrubbing RAM is
detected after 320 minutes. It shows that the self-scrubbing
RAMs have the better performance of error mitigation than
the conventional ECC RAMs in the neutron radiation environ-
ments. In the experiments, the error rates in the conventional
ECC RAM is approximately 4.3 × 10−4bit/(KB·h) , while
the self-scrubbing RAMs is less than 8.7 × 10−5bit/(KB·h),
which is one fifth of the error rate of the conventional ECC
RAMs.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a scheme that combines ECC and
scrubbing methods to mitigate SEUs for the devices are sup-
posed to work in extreme radiation environments. Considering
the high error rates in the extreme radiation environments, both
ECC and scrubbing are used in the scheme to achieve high
reliability.
In the scheme, a scrubber is designed to scrub the RAM
data separately and simultaneously. Hence, the scrubbing
operations can be carried out even when the CPUs are busy.
The hardware costs of the scrubber only grow slightly with
the available RAM size. Therefore, it is suitable for the cheap
devices with limited resources.
The experiments are conducted in the neutron radiation
environments. It is shown that the error rates remain robust
irrespective of the RAM size. The comparison of the radiation
experiments also show that the self-scrubbing scheme is an
effective strategy to hardened the embedded system and the
error rate of the self-scrubbing RAM is one fifth of the
conventional ECC RAM.
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